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ON THE JOB SEARCH AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION
by Tito Boeri
European University Institute and OECD*
Abstract
Evidence on labour market flows in OECD countries suggests that, contrary to 
the popular wisdom, “sclerotic” European labour markets are characterised by 
relatively large rates of job creation and destruction. These large job turnover 
rates stand in sharp contrast with the low turnover of the unemployment pool in 
these countries and point to the important role played by job-to-job shifts in 
Europe. A model is developed which — unlike standard theories of job matching 
with on-the-job search — can account for large job-to-job shifts in the presence of 
high long-term unemployment rates. The two pillars of this model are: i) reduced 
search effectiveness for those with longer unemployment durations; and ii) 
competition for jobs between employed and unemployed jobseekers. Estimates 
of unemployment outflow equations allowing for varying search intensity 
according to unemployment duration and incorporating employed jobseekers do 
not falsify these two basic assumptions of our model.
Keywords: Job-to-job shifts, job turnover, unemployment turnover. 
JEL: J10, J64.
* I am grateful to Michael Burda, Juan Dolado and participants to a workshop in Berlin for useful 
comments on an initial draft and to Lapo Anzilotti for skilful research assistance. The views 






















































































































































































Labour market institutions of most European countries are often believed to inhibit 
the necessary mobility of workers in response to changing patterns in demand. In 
particular, employment security schemes, imposing advance notication of dismissals 
and non-negligible severance payments to employers in case of layoffs, are deemed 
to prevent downward employment adjustment during cyclical downturns and (for 
precautionary reasons) discourage hirings in expansionary periods. Because of these 
regulations and more or less explicit restrictions on temporary contracts, European 
labour markets would tend to offer many "jobs for life" and reduce the competition 
for wages between the "insiders" and the "outsiders". The term "Eurosclerosis" is 
frequently used to contrast this "rigidity" of European labour markets with conditions 
prevailing in countries like the US.
Available data on gross flows of jobs and workers across different labour market 
states (employment, unemployment, non-participation) come from a variety of 
statistical sources (Labour Force Surveys, unemployment registers, social security 
records, etc.) and are not fully comparable. Yet, they suggest that labour mobility is 
not lower in European labour markets than in North-America. Gross job creation 
and destruction rates are in many European countries, larger than in the US or 
Canada and labour turnover rates (the sum of hirings and separations) are of a similar 
order of magnitude than in North-America. Moreover, there are no significant 
differences in the time variation of gross job creation and destruction between 
European and North-American countries, while the strictness of employment security 
schemes would point to a smoother pace of job reallocation in Europe.
While European labour markets appear to be less sclerotic than usually thought, they 
nonetheless display a much poorer employment performance: in the US and Canada, 
employment per capita has continued to grow after the second oil shock, whereas all 
European countries have experienced declines in employment rates in the 1979-90 
period. This poorer score in employment growth has been accompanied with a 
doubling of the incidence of unemployment while North-American countries have 
maintained the unemployment rates prevailing in the late 1970s. Moreover, the 
unemployment pool in Europe is stagnant: low inflow rates (persons entering 
unemployment over the working age population) point to a reatively low risk of 



























































































a job, it is much more difficult to be reintegrated into work in Europe than in other 
OECD countries.
As flows from employment to non-participation are in Europe certainly not larger 
than those of North-American countries, large job reallocation rates and low 
unemployment turnover can only be reconciled by the occurrence of many direct 
shifts of workers from one job to another not involving intervening unemployment 
spells. Rather than the little mobility of the workforce, a distinguishing feature o f 
European labour markets seems to be therefore the large proportion o f job-to-job 
(JJ) shifts.
Why are JJ shifts so important in European labour markets? In this paper we argue 
that tight labour market regulations do not prevent the mobility of workers, but alter 
the characteristics of the job reallocation process. In particular, they reduce the role 
played in gross job creation and destruction by unemployment turnover. Insofar as 
employment security schemes constrain layoff and dismissal policies of firms, they 
reduce the pace of inflows into unemployment while they foster job-to-job shifts via 
two main channels. On the demand side, employers may induce workers to 
voluntarily leave, helping them to find alternative employment opportunities, rather 
than incurring in high dismissal costs. On the supply side, workers may find it less 
risky to look for another job while being employed and to change jobs because they 
fear less competition for jobs on the part of the unemployed, whose search 
effectiveness declines together with unemployment duration (e.g., because of human 
capital depreciation).
Policy-induced job-to-job shifts reduce the amount of job reallocation which can be 
accommodated via unemployment inflows and outflows, thereby increasing long­
term unemployment and further reducing the “marketability” of those searching 
without having a job. Insofar as employers use voluntary separations as a way to 
costlessy reduce their workforce, quitters are not replaced and hence no vacancy 
chains are set in motion which could end-up creating other employment opportunities 
for the unemployed.
Surprisingly enough, these possible links between job-to-job shifts and 
unemployment durations have been fairly neglected by the literature on labour market 




























































































assumed away, it is supposed to be either a constant fraction of the labour force or to 
be dependent on the stocks of employment opportunities per jobseeker, summarised 
by unemployment/vacancy ratios. In other words, on the job search is either 
exogenous or is negatively correlated with unemployment, which is at odds with 
evidence discussed above, namely with the role played by job-to-job shifts in high 
unemployment Europe.
In this paper we show that endogenous on-the-job search can have implications 
which are not counterfactual. When allowance is made for negative duration 
dependence in exits from unemployment, on-the-job search can account for the high 
persistence of European unemployment compared with the US. Under duration 
dependence, on-the-job search is a function not only of the magnitude, but also of the 
duration structure of unemployment. Employed jobseekers compete mainly with the 
short-term unemployed as the long-term unemployed have low search effectiveness. 
It follows that, per given unemployment levels, a larger incidence of long-term 
unemployment tends to stimulate on-the-job-search and hence the proportion of 
vacancies filled via job-to-job shifts rather than via outflows from unemployment. In 
other words, endogenous on-the-job search tends to magnify the effects of duration 
on exits from unemployment at the aggregate level. Even mild forms of duration 
dependence can generate persistence in unemployment because of the competition 
between employed and unemployed jobseekers.
The plan is as follows. In Section 1 we present evidence on gross labour market 
flows in OECD countries. In Section 2, we introduce a simple model of endogenous 
job search and duration dependence. Finally, in Section 3 we empirically assess the 




























































































1. Employment Security, Job and Unemployment Flows
A  common implication of models analysing the impact of employment security 
schemes on the labour market is that firing costs, procedural obstacles1 to the layoff 
of workers and limits on the use of fixed-term contracts, tend to reduce not only gross 
job destruction, but also gross job creation [Bertola, 1990; Bertola and Ichino, 1994; 
Burgess, 1994; Millard and Mortensen, 1994]. Risk adverse employers are, in fact, 
likely to take into account the costs associated to reducing the workforce during "bad 
times" when deciding upon employment adjustment in response to improvements in 
the demand for their products. It follows that the extent of job reallocation — 
commonly measured by job turnover rates (the sum of new positions created in new 
and expanding units plus posts being closed as a result of plant closures or 
downsizing, as a fraction of total employment) — should be lower in countries with 
strict employment security schemes than in more "flexible" environments.
While these models have clearcut implications on the impact of employment security 
regulations on gross job flows, their predictions concerning the effects of layoff and 
dismissal constraints on employment and unemployment stocks are ambiguous 
[Lazear, 1981; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Mortensen and Millard, 1994], This is 
because employment security regulations tend to have offsetting effects on the 
incidence (because of lower job destruction rates, hence lower inflows into 
unemployment) and on the duration of unemployment (because of lower outflows 
from unemployment). The overall impact of regulations on employment and 
unemployment will therefore depend on various factors, including the capacity of 
insiders to exploit the bargaining power given by firing restrictions, the importance of 
deterrents on gross job creation, and is likely to vary depending on the size of 
statutory severance pay and on the characteristics of regulations. 1
1 Procedural obstacles (such as formal requests to the Labour Inspectorate, notification of  
planned layoffs to the trade unions, etc.) play in some countries (e.g., the Netherlands and Spain) 
even more important a role in delaying the pace at which firms shed redundant labour than 
regulations on severance pay. See Grubb and Wells (1993) for a well-documented discussion o f  




























































































Overall, economic theory suggests that overregulated labour markets should 
experience relatively low gross job flows, but does not seem to reach clearcut 
conclusions as to the effects of employment security regulations on employment and 
unemployment stocks. Unfortunately, empirical evidence shows quite the opposite.
Table 1 displays rank correlation coefficients between, on the one hand, a ranking of 
countries by the strictness of employment security regulations recently produced by 
OECD (1994) and, on the other hand, average 1983-93 standardised unemployment 
stocks and flows figures2. In order to improve the cross-country comparability of 
data, we used unemployment stock and flow data coming from national Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS). These allow to approximate internationally agreed definitions of 
employment and unemployment, thereby improving the measurement of the 
incidence of unemployment. However, LFS provide less accurate measures of 
unemployment inflows. The latter can be measured by counting those found at the 
survey date to have been unemployed for less than one month, which means that 
unemployment spells started and ending in the month before the survey date are not 
counted. It follows that inflow rates are likely to be underestimated especially in 
dynamic labour markets where there are large cohorts entering and leaving 
unemployment within a month3. Data on job turnover, gross job creation and 
destruction are drawn from a database recently assembled by OECD4. They come 
from administrative records (e.g., social security, unemployment insurance and tax 
forms filled in by employers) tracking changes in the number of employees in each 
individual private establishments, excluding the self-employed. Although there are 
several problems with the cross-country comparability of such data5, they
2 Unlike previous rankings proposed by the literature, the ranking used in Table 1 takes into 
account important features o f  employment security regulations, such as procedural and legal 
obstacles to dismissals.
3 Another option would have been to use data coming from administrative sources (e.g., 
unemployment registers), which track all persons registering at labour offices within a month, but 
are also affected by the coverage and generosity o f  unemployment benefit systems in the various 
countries and hence offer a poor basis for international comparisons.
4  See OECD (1994) for a detailed description o f  national sources for job turnover data.





























































































nonetheless offer a broad indication of the extent of job reallocation in the various 
countries.
Bearing the above caveats in mind, the table suggests that constraints on the ease 
with which firms can shed labour bear a strong inverse relationship with the size of 
inflow rates (the rank correlation coefficient is -.79 which is significant at 99 per cent 
confidence levels) while they are not significantly correlated to unemployment 
incidence. Surprisingly enough, there seems to be no correlation between strictness 
of employment security regulations and the extent of job reallocation.6
While there seems not to be any correlation between the magnitude of gross job 
flows and employment protection schemes, OECD countries with particularly strict 
regulations on dismissals and lower inflows into unemployment generally display the 
highest unemployment rates. The top panel of Chart 1 plots average unemployment 
and average monthly inflow rates (both weighted by the average yearly labour force) 
in OECD countries in the 1983-93 period. Consistently with the results displayed in 
Table 1, the chart shows that the countries which are typically located at the top 
positions of rankings by the strictness of employment protection legislations (e.g., 
Southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal) display the lowest 
inflows into unemployment7. It also shows that some of the countries with the lowest 
unemployment rates display the highest inflows into unemployment. In particular, all 
non-European countries (except Japan, a country whose labour market institutions 
have been traditionally favourable to long job tenures) display relatively large inflows 
and relatively low unemployment levels. Finally, the bottom panel of Chart 1 shows 
that many low unemployment inflow countries display relatively large job 
reallocation rates. In particular, Italy, France and the Nordics belong to a group of 
countries with relatively low inflows into unemployment, but relatively large job 
reallocation rates.
6 The effects o f  employment security regulations on the time-series properties o f  job turnover 
rates are analysed in Boeri (1995). We found that "overregulated" labour markets do not display 
either lower variability o f  gross job creation and destruction and cannot account for observed 
asymmetries in the cyclical behaviour o f  job turnover in the US compared to the other (mainly 
European) countries.




























































































Overall, contrary to predictions of various models of job reallocation with hiring and 
firing costs, strict employment security, regulations go hand by hand with lower 
inflows into unemployment, but not necessarily with lower job and labour mobility. 
Moreover, there is not a positive correlation8 between the size of inflows and the 
levels of unemployment across OECD countries, while we would expect inflow rates 
and unemployment rates to be strictly associated at least in the long-run9.
Chart 2 helps understanding why, contrary to predictions of economic theory, there is 
not a negative correlation between the extent of job reallocation and the strictness of 
labour market regulations. The scatter diagram reports job destruction rates and 
(yearly) inflow rates in a number of OECD countries (both weighted by the labour 
force in each country). Job destruction and unemployment inflow data are clearly not 
strictly comparable as they come from different statistical sources (see above) and are 
based on different measurement criteria10. Job destruction rates are defined as a sum 
of first-differences in establishment-level employment stocks of shrinking units from 
one year to another, while yearly inflow rates cumulate quarterly flows into 
unemployment. Hence, we would generally expect inflow rates to exceed overall 
rates of job destruction. Yet, many European countries are located above the 
bisecting fine throughout the origin of Chart 2. This suggests that compared to 
countries like Canada or the US, in most European countries a relatively minor
8 The slope coefficient o f  the regression o f  unemployment against inflow rates is -1.42, which is 
not significant at conventional levels.
9 As shown by Hall (1982), when gross flows from and to non-participation can be neglected, 
the steady state unemployment rate is given by:
i
i + o
where "i" denotes the unemployment inflow rate (inflows into unemployment as a fraction o f  the 
employed)’ while "o" stands for the outflow rate (exit from unemployment as a fraction o f  
unemployment). This suggests that unemployment should be in the long-term inversely correlated 
with the magnitude o f  inflow rates.
10 As discussed above, inflow rates are calculated based on the breakdown o f  unemployed by 
duration while job destruction rates are defined as the sum o f establishment-level employment 




























































































component o f employment reductions is accommodated via flows into 
unemployment.
The coexistence of comparatively large job destruction rates and low inflows into 
unemployment in "sclerotic" European countries could be explained by relatively 
large flows from employment to non-participation. Put another way, job destruction 
in Europe would be to a large extent accommodated by inducing workers to retire or 
withdraw from the labour force rather than becoming unemployed. However, data 
on flows from employment to non-participation in OECD countries do not lend 
support to this hypothesis. The top panel of Table 2 displays data obtained from 
linked LFS records (i.e. exploiting the panel component of each survey in order to get 
objective information on the same individual at different points in time); the bottom 
panel shows the same flows as could be estimated on the basis of retrospective 
questions (i.e. subjective individuals' answers concerning her/his labour market 
status one year before)". Both sources seem to suggest that the countries where the 
extent of job destruction largely exceeds inflows into unemployment (e.g. 
Netherlands and Sweden and, in general, “sclerotic” European countries vis-a-vis 
North-America) experience relatively low flows from employment to non- 
participation1 2. Put another way, countries with the lowest inflows into 
unemployment as a proportion of the labour force (second column, reporting yearly 
inflow rates) are also characterised by comparatively low EO flows. This is 
consistent with the observation of even more marked differences across countries in 
the magnitude of total outflows from employment (second column, bottom panel).
Thus, large job reallocation rates and low unemployment turnover in "sclerotic" 
European labour markets can only be explained by a large number of workers 
changing jobs without intervening unemployment spells. Put another way, large job- 
to-job shifts seem to be the dominant factor behind the suprisingly large job
11 The availability o f  data for most countries for one-period only prevented us from 
controlling for cyclical conditions. Yet, observations referred the same year (and hence 
presumably the same cyclical conditions) for different countries still support the claim that EO 
flow s are not larger in European labour markets than in the US.
12 This is consistent with evidence on gross labour market flows recently assembled by Burda 





























































































reallocation rates experienced by European countries. Unfortunately, no direct 
evidence is available on the magnitude of job-to-job shifts in the various countries. 
Yet data on job tenures in the EC13 support the view that rigid labour markets 
generate comparatively large JJ shifts. In particular, they point to very large job-to- 
job shifts in Spain (with about one in four people changing job within a year) while 
the most "flexible" European labour market, the UK, displays mobility rates not 
dissimilar from those of a “rigid” country like Portugal and close to the EC average.
Bringing the different pieces of evidence together, a distinguishing feature o f  
"sclerotic" European versus North-American labour markets is not the lower pace 
o f job reallocation, but the fact that most o f this job turnover is accommodated 
without intervening unemployment spells. This solves the puzzle, but opens two 
relevant questions. First, why is that tight labour market regulations produce so many 
job-to-job shifts? Theories of insiders-outsiders would suggest that employment 
security regulations could strenghten the bargaining power of insiders. This should 
result into higher wages, and longer job tenures, rather than in large job-to-job shifts. 
Second, why is high unemployment so frequently associated with low inflow rates?
In the following section we explore a possible answer to both questions. Sclerotic 
labour markets produce many job-to-job shifts because there are low flows into 
unemployment, and hence less competition for jobs on the part of unemployed 
jobseekers. A large number of employed jobseekers in turn makes it more difficult 
for the unemployed to be reintegrated into employment, puts a cap on the number of 
posts which can be filled by hiring unemployed persons. In this environment, 
equilibrium unemployment builds up only when it is of increasing duration, in line 
with long-term trends of unemployment in OECD countries.





























































































2. A Simple Model
Standard models of job matching under search equilibrium either assume away on- 
the-job search or treat it is a constant fraction of the labour force. As the flows from 
and to non-participation are typically neglected by this literature, on the job search is 
ultimately exogenous even in the models that do not confine job search to the 
unemployed. Two important exceptions are the models recently developed by 
Burgess (1993) and Pissarides (1994), which, developing on the framework 
originally proposed by Jovanovic (1979 and 1984), endogenize on-the-job search by 
explicitly modelling the decision to engage in job search on the part of those holding 
a job. In Pissarides' and Burgess' models, competition (or congestion) between 
employed and unemployed jobseekers results into an inverse relationship between, 
on the one hand, unemployment/vacancy ratios and, on the other hand, number of 
employed engaging in job-search, which is at odds with evidence displayed above. 
The latter suggests that high-unemployment countries, particularly countries with 
high long-term unemployment rates, are characterised by larger job-to-job shifts, 
hence supposedly by a larger fraction of employment engaged in job search.
Unlike Burgess and Pissarides, we will not impose in our model that unemployed of 
different duration face the same job finding probabilities, but allow short-term 
unemployed to have a higher probability of being reintegrated into work than the 
long-term unemployed. Negative effects of unemployment duration on job finding 
rates can be the byproduct of discouragement effects, human capital depreciation or 
loss of informal contacts with employers, marketplace effects promoting stock-flow 
(as opposed to stock-stock) matches (Coles and Smith, 1994) or ranking (based on 
unemployment durations) in hiring strategies of employers (Blanchard and Diamond, 
1994). Any of the above mentioned explanations for negative duration dependence 
in job matching can be accommodated within our simplified framework without 
altering the relevant predictions of the model. Consequently, we do not opt for any 
specific theory (neither we could empirically discriminate among them in the light of 
data limitations) and we use the rather neutral term search effectiveness to denote 
these asymmetries between short-term and long-term unemployment.
Job-to-job transition rates will also be allowed to differ from exit-to-job rates for the 




























































































this difference, as neither empirical evidence or theoretical considerations can offer 
much guidance in this respect. On the one hand, employed jobseekers may 
experience higher job finding rates because their employment is considered as a good 
signal by the employer or they have better access than the unemployed to (informal) 
information channels on job opportunities. On the other hand, the (short-term) 
unemployed are likely to devote more time and efforts to job search than the 
employed jobseekers and to be available to immediately pick up opportunities as 
soon as they arise.
The above considerations can be summarised in the multi-level matching function:
JC, =  M(J*,.i,V,-i) = MfsuUh + slU'i.i + sjJ i-i.V i.i) si < su. si < sj ( 1 )
where Us, U1 and J denote, respectively, short-term and long-term unemployed and 
employed engaged in job search, JC stands for (gross) job creation and V for the 
vacancy stock while J* is total number of "effective" jobseekers (i.e., converted by 
proper weighting into efficiency units). In other words, for simplicity (and because 
we aim at developing implications which can be empirically tested based on available 
data) we assume that employed jobseekers, short-term unemployed and long-term 
unemployed are, from the standpoint of matching technologies, perfectly substitutable 
up to scalar parameters. An advantage of this specification is that it allows for 
simple empirical tests of the hypothesis of varying versus fixed search effectiveness 
among employed jobseekers, short-term and long-term unemployed14. Consistently 
with most literature on gross job flows, we will also assume that matching 
technologies (not necessarily unemployment outflows!) are homogenous of degree 
one in V and J*. This mles out (counterfactual) implications such as the presence in 
large countries of relatively low gross hiring rates and is consistent with a constant 
growth of employment along the balanced growth path.
14 See Section 3. The parameters su,sl and sj can be interpreted as the product between, on the 
one hand, the share o f  job offers going, respectively, to short-term and long-term unemployed and 
to employed jobseekers, and, on the other hand, corresponding job acceptance probabilities. 




























































































Under these matching technologies, transition rates from short-term unemployment to 
employment (7tj, from long-term unemployment to employment (7ti), and from 





To simplify matters, we define the short-term unemployed as those workers who 
have been unemployed for one period only15. Their value function is therefore given
where u denotes the unemployment benefit, cu is the cost of job search for the 
unemployed and 8 is the discount factor. Similarly, the value of being long-term 
unemployed is given by:
15 This implies that the stock o f  short-term unemployed is determined only by the magnitude of  
inflows into unemployment.
by:




























































































V'u = u-Cu+&[nimzx.(VE,Vj) + ( I -n i )V lu] (  6 )
where for simplicity we assume that asymmetries between long-term and short-term 
unemployed are confined to job finding rates only16. The two remaining values are 
those most relevant for decisions of employed to engage or not in job search. First, 
we have the value of searching while being employed:
V, = w, - c 3 + 5 |7  - d )/jr , V, + (7 - Jt, J m axi V,.,V,)I + &d V'„ ( 7 )
where C2 denotes costs of job search for the employed, d the (exogenous) dismissal 
rate (see below), and w the wage rate currently earned by the jobseeker. As is 
apparent from (7) a successful employed jobseeker waits at least one period before 
seeking for another job in his/her new position. Finally, we have the value of being 
employed and not seeking for another job:
Vr = wr + S[(I -d)max/V,, V,) + dV'J ( 8 )
An employed jobseeker will continue to search for a job insofar as Vj > Ve. As in 
Jovanovic (1984) model, this condition implicitly defines a cutoff wage rate (say w*) 
at which workers are indifferent between continuing or terminating job search whilst 
being employed. Those earning less than w* will search, while those earning more 
will not.
A non-degenerate wage distribution can be obtained simply by hitting match 
productivity with idiosyncratic shocks (having some degree of persistence in order to 
induce on-the-job search in presence of search costs). Along with Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994), we will therefore assume that wages are a constant fraction of
16 We could have assumed that the long-term unemployed are entitled to lower (if any) 
unemployment benefits or that they face higher search costs than the new entrants into 
unemployment pool, but this would have not altered the properties o f our model while making its 




























































































match-specific productivity and that the latter evolves in accordance to a Poisson 
process with arrival rate X. When match productivity changes, it is drawn from a 
(fixed) distribution with finite (and positive17) upper and lower supports. As shown 
in Annex 1, the reservation wage, w* will then depend on 7tj and on the other relevant 
parameters of (5), (6), (7) and (8). In particular, w* is increasing in Jtj, that is, for 
larger job-to-job transition rates a larger portion of employment will engage in job 
search.
When deciding on whether or not to engage in job search, employed individuals form 
expectations about the probability of finding a suitable job, based on current levels of 
short-term and long-term unemployment as well as vacancies. Now, from (1), (2), 
(3) and (4) we have the partials:
5jtj 8jCy
5 U‘ < 5 U'
< 0, 5 K,
5V
> 0 ( 9 )
In other words, ceteris paribus, an increase by one unit of the stock of short-term 
unemployed reduces job-to-job transition rates more than a marginal increase in the 
stock of long-term unemployed because of the greater search effectiveness of those 
with short unemployment durations. In the light of (9) we can then write the 
proportion (j> of employed engaged in job search, as a function of vacancies and of the 
two unemployment pools:
<t>(Kt/\t/') <t>v > 0 ,  (|>, < <|>, < 0 (10)
Unlike in Pissarides and Burgess models, the proportion of employed jobseekers is 
therefore a function not only of unemployment and vacancy stocks, but also of the 
flows characterising the duration structure of unemployment.
17 Allowing for match productivity to fall below zero would ultimately imply endogenising 




























































































Our next step is to relate job-to-job shifts to employment dynamics. The law of 
motion of gross job creation is given by equation (1). Concerning job destruction, we 
assume that each year a fraction d of the total number of workers is laid-off18 because 
their jobs become unprofitable (e.g., due to idiosyncratic shocks to match 
productivity). We further assume that laid-off workers cannot immediately move to 
new posts, but have to experience an intervening unemployment spell19. This is 
consistent with the view of job matching as a time-consuming process requiring on 
both sides, employers and jobseekers, active search. Normalising the labour force to 
one, it then follows that gross job destruction is given by:
JD, = [d + ( l -d )n ,  Q](l-U,-i> (11 )
In other words, JD occurs either as a result of genuine job destruction, that is, jobs 
becoming unprofitable or as a byproduct of voluntary quits of workers being 
successful in their on-the-job search. In order to close our model, we have still to 
specify the law of motion of vacancies. We assume that new vacancies are posted at 
a rate y of the total number of idle positions (unemployment less unfilled vacancies). 
Vacancies are then filled next period via the matching technology described by (1), 
i.e.:
18 Another possible departure from our simplified setup, would be to assume that d (as well as 
the parameter g defined below), rather than being deterministic, depends on the realisation o f  an 
aggregate shock (Boeri (1995)). We do not follow this route here as w e are interested in the 
steady state properties o f our model only.
19 This means that in our model labour turnover (the sum o f  hirings and separations) always 




























































































A V, =y(U,-i - V,.,)-M(J V,.,) ( 12)
Equation (12) therefore implies that voluntary quitters are not replaced by employers, 
who rather use voluntary separations as a way to reduce their workforce. Put another 
way, quits do not set in motion a vacancy chain20.
Following Blanchard and Diamond (1989), we do not allow wage determination to 
play any role in job matching this model21 and we focus on stationary wage 
distributions. Given that the proportion of employed jobseekers engaged in job 
search is constant when vacancy, short-term and long-term unemployment stocks do 
not vary, the labour force is fixed, and short-term unemployment always equals 
unemployment inflows (i.e. a constant proportion of employment given by the 
exogenous layoff rate), the steady state equilibrium can be fully characterised by the 
two conditions:
AU = d(I-U)[l-suM(l,j-^)]-sl U 'M ( l , ^ )  = 0 ( 13)
stating that inflows into unemployment, less the short-term unemployment finding a 
job within one period (i.e., inflows into long-term unemployment) should equal 
outflows from long-term unemployment and:
20 Alternatively, we could have assumed that only a fraction o f  quitters is replaced, and 
that this fraction is decreasing in the degree o f  strictness o f  employment security regulations 
(hence the use o f  quits as substitutes for layoffs). While this would be a straightforward 
extension o f  our model, available data do not allow to empirically assess such parameter 
restrictions.
21 Match productivity does not affect match acceptance insofar as wages are established (e.g., 
under Nash bargaining) as a constant fraction o f  the match surplus [Blanchard and Diamond, 1989], 
Alternatively, we could assume — along with Jovanovic’s (1984) model — that wages equal labour 
productivity but that — due to noisy signals'of individuals' abilities — employers and workers only 
gradually leant about the true productivity o f  their match. In both cases pj has to be interpreted as 
an offer arrival rate, independent o f  the current wage earned by the employed jobseeker, and hence 




























































































A V= y(U -V)-M (J* ,V) = 0 ( 14 )
stating that the inflow of vacancies should equal the total number of matches (filled 
vacancies).
Chart 1 displays the Beveridge (UV) and the vacancy (VV) curves, implicitly 
defined by equations (13) and (14), in the U-V space. Both curves have the standard 
slope insofar as §J*/8U' is negative, that is, a marginal rise in long-term 
unemployment leads to a reduction in in the number of "effective" jobseekers 
because of the substitution of unemployed for employed jobseekers. This will always 
be the case when si is small relative to sj22.
The economics behind the slope of the two curves is as follows. The UV curve 
slopes downwards because, per given inflow rate, a rise in unemployment has to be 
compensated by lower vacancies in order to keep unemployment outflows constant. 
As shown in Annex 2, the UV curve is steeper the more responsive is J to changes in 
the number of long-term unemployed: a rise in U1 would in fact increase 
unemployment outflows either directly and indirectly, that is, via reductions in the 
number of competing jobseekers who are not coming from the unemployment ranks.
The VV curve is upward sloping because larger vacancy inflows (as those 
associated to a rise in the number of idle positions, per given y) have to be 
compensated by an increase in the number of filled positions, hence, given the 
matching technology, by a larger number of vacancies. The lower si relative to sj, the 
greater the reduction in the number of "effective" job seekers associated to changes in 
U, the steeper the curve, because more vacancies will be required to compensate 
reductions in the overall effectiveness of job matching.
The steady state equilibrium lying at the intersection of the two curves is globally 
stable.
22 In fact:
~  = sl-sj($-$,(l-U))




























































































We can now assess the comparative statics effects at the steady state of changes in 
the (exogenous) job destruction rate, d (e.g., induced by marginal reductions in the 
strictness of employment security schemes). As depicted in Chart 1 (the formal 
derivation is in Annex 2), these involve a rightward shift of the UV curve like in 
standard matching models23. However, in this case also the VV curve will shift 
because of substitution between employed and unemployed jobseekers on job 
matching, hence on the pace at which vacancies are filled. In particular, the VV 
curve will shift rightward when the total number of effective jobseekers (J*) 
decreases as a result of the increase in the number of short-term unemployed. In this 
case, along with conventional wisdom, the long-run equilbrium unemployment rate 
will rise. But the VV curve could also shift leftwards thereby leading to lower 
unemployment and vacancy rates. In general the larger the search effectiveness of 
short-term unemployed relative to employed jobseekers (i.e, the larger su relative to 
sj), the more responsive the share o f employed seeking jobs to increased 
competition from unemployed jobseekers24, the more likely that larger 
unemployment inflows could translate into lower unemployment in the long-run. 
The effects of a rise in job destruction on unemployment are therefore ambiguous, 
while at the new steady state equilibrium, there will always be a larger number of 
vacancies.
3. Empirical Relevance of the Model
Two basic assumptions of our model are i) declining search effectiveness with 
unemployment duration, and ii) competition for jobs between employed and 
unemployed jobseekers. Hence, we will first evaluate the empirical relevance of the 
first assumption, based on estimates of unemployment outflow equations. Next, we 
will turn our attention to available evidence, coming mainly from Labour Force
23 See Boeri (1995) for an analysis o f the effects o f  changes in the tightness o f  employment 
security regulations on job flows in standard matching models.
24 The elasticity o f (|> with respect to changes in the number o f  short-term unemployed will also 
depend on the characteristics o f  the underlying wage distribution. The more compressed the wage 
distribution (at least in a contour o f the initial reservation wage), the stronger the effects o f  changes 




























































































Surveys, on search on-the-job and estimate matching functions embodying the 
competition for jobs between unemployed and employed jobseekers.
Table 3 displays results obtained by estimating a matching function in which the 
unemployment stock was split into two separate pools, according to the duration of 
spells of joblessness. In particular, the functional form used in estimation was the 
CES:
OJn = Aulsu Ul,.;p + si U l , 9 v?,.,ec" (15 )
where Ait denotes fixed regional (subscript i) and time (e.g., "disembodied" 
technological progress in job matching, subscript t) effects. In other words, 
consistently with the specialization of the matching function provided in the model, 
we allowed the two unemployment pools to be perfectly substitutable up to a 
multiplicative parameter. We also did not impose homogeneity of degree one in the 
three arguments as constant returns in job matching (including employed jobseekers) 
does not necessarily imply constant returns in outflows to jobs25. By taking logs and 
a second-order expansion around p=0, we then obtained the linear form:
a„ + su k uu+slk  p k su sl[u‘n-ri (16)
An advantage of this linearisation is that it allows for the identification of the 
structural parameters of interest26 *(namely su, si, v and p) and hence for simple tests
25 See Burgess (1993) for a discussion o f  properties o f  unemployment outflow functions in 
relation to those o f the underlying matching function.
26 In fact, based on (16), we can estimate:
on = d, +d, + +  (3,«!,./+Y [uli.i-uLi]2 + o. vu-i + Eu
where d stand for district (subscript i) and time (subscript t) dummies. We can recover the 




























































































of the hypothesis that search effectiveness is higher for short-term than long-term 
unemployed.
We run this regression against a panel of yearly data on the OECD countries 
displayed in Chart l 27, as well as monthly, district-level data on unemployment 
stocks by duration, outflows to jobs as well as vacancies notified to the labour 
exchange for the Czech and Slovak Republics. The latter data clearly offer much 
more degrees of freedom in selecting the estimation framework than aggregate yearly 
data'8. As we could check in the course of visits to labour offices of the Czech and 
Slovak lands, they are high-quality administrative data. In both countries, 
unemployment benefits are provided up to six months of duration29 *. However, those 
who have not found a job within that period have to keep registration to labour 
offices in order to apply for forms of social assistance of the last resort. Hence, 
unsurprisingly, comparisons with the national LFS suggest that register data offer a 
good coverage of long-term unemployment in both countries.
_ P  
P: + P,
and
_ P  
P,+ P
* = P,+ P,
p = -2y(P, + P3)/Pi P;
27 Unfortunately available data for OECD countries do not permit to disentangle 
outflows to jobs from flow s from unemployment to out-of-the labour force, which may be 
positively correlated with the duration o f  unemployment (e.g. because o f  discouraged workers 
effects). This suggests that differences in elasticity o f  job finding with respect to short-term 
and long-term unemployment would be more marked when focusing only on UE flows.
28 An important advantage o f  using administrative data, rather than information coming from 
the national Labour Force Surveys, is that the former provide much richer a detail o f  unemployment 
and vacancy flows by region. This relevant cross-sectional dimension o f  data significantly increase 
the degrees o f  freedom allowing, inter alia, for taking into account "technological progress" in job 
matching (e.g., including time dummies) as well as possible regime shifts alterating the properties o f  
matching functions.
29 The two countries have maintained, with a few exceptions, the same labour market policy
regulations prevailing before the split o f  the country. While the Czech Republic has been able to 
maintain — unlike all the other transitional economies o f  central and eastern Europe -- very low 




























































































Table 3 reports estimates in levels (including time and district dummies in the case of 
the Czech and Slovak Republics) as well as in first differences. When we included a 
lagged endogenous variable in the difference equation, we used a GMM estimator 
(hence different instruments in different periods) defined over lagged outflows from t- 
2 backward. The long-term unemployed were defined either as those having been 
registered for at least 12 months (which is in line with commonly agreed definitions 
of long-term unemployment) and as those with unemployment duration greater than 
one month, which more closely corresponds to the specification of our model.
Regression results support the existence of decreasing "search effectiveness" with 
unemployment duration. Both su and si coefficients are positive and significant (with 
the exception of the si coefficient in the level regression for the Czech Republic and, 
in some cases, when we approximate short-term unemployment by inflows), but su is 
much larger than si. It should be stressed that, according to our model, the omission 
of employed jobseekers in the estimated unemployment outflow equation would bias 
upwards30 the estimates of both short-term and long-term unemployment coefficients 
because these coefficients embody the effects of reductions in the number of 
(competing) employed jobseekers associated to a rise in Us and/or U1. In particular, 
the larger sj, and the more responsive employed jobseekers to changes in 
unemployment, the larger the bias induced by omitting J from the estimated equation. 
The vacancy coefficient will instead be biased downwards31, which may contribute
30 In fact for i =  s, 1: 
8 0  8 0  O , ,
8 U‘ 8 C/'i, J *
where T|mj* stands for the elasticity o f matching with respect to J* (included between zero and one, 
by the assumption o f  constant returns to scale), and Ju for the responsiveness o f  employed 
jobseekers to a marginal increase in unemployment (negative in our model).
31 In fact:
8 0  5 0  O , ,--------- = — l - r \ ) s , j y
8V J*
where rimv stands for the elasticity o f  matching with respect to vacancies, and Jv for the 




























































































to explain the low V coefficients generally obtained when approximating matching 
functions with estimates of unemployment outflow equations32.
Overall, estimates o f the unemployment outflow equations consistently point to 
significant effects o f duration on job finding probabilities. Studies carried out on 
micro data from the unemployment register in the Czech and Slovak lands [Ham, 
Svejnar and Terrel, 1994] found a negative (but weaker) effect of duration on 
individual hazard rates. Our estimates point to much a stronger effect of 
unemployment duration on job finding rates, which could be possibly explained by 
the fact that competition effects between unemployed and employed jobseekers can 
only be captured by using aggregate data33.
Further insights on the empirical relevance of our model can be possibly gained by 
looking directly at data on employed jobseekers. Needless to say, the identification 
and measurement of employed actively seeking for a job is a dauntingly difficult task.
However, the Eurostat Labour Force Survey questionnaire — currently adopted by 
most EC countries (as well as, with minor changes, by some central european 
countries) -- requires interviewers to query on job search activities on the part not 
only of the unemployed, but also of those being employed at the survey date34.
32 Tests o f constant returns in long-term, short-term unemployment and vacancies are also 
reported in Table 3, although they cannot be interpreted as tests o f constant returns in the overall 
matching technologies in the light o f  the above qualifications. In any event, we reject the presence 
o f  constant returns in job matching consistently with previous estimates o f  unemployment outflow 
equations in these countries [Boeri, 1994; Burda and Lyubiova, 1994], Finally, displayed test- 
statistics for r support the CES functional form specification against the Cobb-Douglas, lending 
further support to our assumptions concerning the substitutability between long-term and short­
term unemployed.
33 The gap between the estimated search effectiveness o f  short-term and long-term unemployed 
may also be affected by the omission o f  employed jobseekers insofar as J may be more responsive to 
changes in Us than U1 (which is also consistent with our model).
34 The question asked to all individuals in working age is "Have you been looking for a job last 
week?". If the answer is positive, the interviewed is then requested to specify the reasons and 




























































































Questions are also included in the LFS questionnaire as to the reasons for job search 
and the methods of search of employed jobseekers. Cross-tabulations of employed 
jobseekers by reason and method of job search — which we could obtain only for a 
few European countries (UK, Italy and Slovenia) — suggest that those seeking a job 
because their current position is temporary or fear losing their job use search methods 
not too dissimilar from those of the unemployed. In particular, those "pushed" to 
seek a job use more than other employed jobseekers the public employment service 
and its vacancy register. Those seeking because "pulled" from other jobs, i.e. those 
declaring to be searching because looking for better jobs, use more insertions and 
newspaper ads as well as informal channels than unemployed jobseekers. They also 
have, in general, higher levels of education than the unemployed.
Table 4 reports average 1983-91 data drawn from national Labour Force Surveys of 
European countries on employed declaring to be searching for another job. As we 
expect competition with unemployed jobseekers to especially arise on the part of the 
"push" group, we provide information not only on total employed jobseekers, but 
also on the various components of this population. In particular, JTOT refers to the 
grandtotal of those working and declaring to be actively searching for a job in the 
reference week, JPUSH to those declaring to be searching because their current job 
is at risk or temporary, and JPULL for those explicitly declaring to be seeking better 
working conditions.
Table 4 suggests that on-the-job search is remarkably large in transitional economies, 
like Poland and the Czech Republic, which are coming from very rigid labour 
markets (markets where there was no freedom to dismiss workers) and at the start of 
transition have introduced rather tight regulations on advance notification of layoffs 
and severance pay in order to contain inflows into unemployment35. Relatively large 
shares of employed seeking for another job, notably JPUSH measures, are also 
observed in some of the European countries placed at the top of rankings by the 
strictness of employment security schemes, like with Italy and Spain. More flexible 
labour markets, like the UK and Denmark, also display relatively large shares of 
employed jobseekers, but these are mainly of a JPULL nature (fourth column). The 
(cross-sectional) correlation coefficients displayed at the bottom of Table 4 confirm
35 See OECD (1994) and Boeri (1994) for a discussion o f  employment security regulations after 




























































































the impression that the two pools of employed jobseekers have quite different 
characteristics and responsiveness to labour market conditions. While one finds less 
JPULL type of jobseekers in high unemployment countries, the number of those 
pushed to search on-the-job tends, if anything, to be positively associated with labour 
market slack. Moreover, only JPULL is significantly (and positively) correlated 
across countries to vacancy rates, suggesting that those “attracted” by other jobs may 
be more responsive to a greater availability of employment opportunities than those 
“forced” to search. We interpret these results as indications that the proposed 
breakdown of JTOT disentangles two significantly different populations of employed 
jobseekers.
Based on data on employed job seekers and labour market flows in a number of 
OECD countries, we cand then empirically assess whether employed jobseekers are 
actually competing for posts with the unemployed. The competition hypothesis has 
three testable implications. First, as shown above, it implies that estimates of 
unemployment outflow equations not controlling for employed jobseekers tend to 
overstate the elasticity of job finds with respect to unemployment. This is because a 
larger unemployment pool tends to discourage on-the-job search thereby increasing 
outflows per given levels of unemployment and vacancies. Second, competition for 
jobs implies that unemployment outflow rates (that is, outflows as proportion of the 
unemployment stock at the beginning of the period) should be decreasing in the 
number of employed jobseekers, while complementarity effects imply a positive 
elasticity of unemployment outflows with respect to employed jobseekers. Third, 
competition between employed and unemployed jobseekers involves decreasing 
vacancies in job-to-job shifts, while “musical chair” effects imply that for each 
vacancy filled by an employed jobseeker another vacancy is opened, that is, 
vacancies are non-decreasing in the extent of worker flows from one job to another.
Table 5 reports estimates of unemployment outflows, outflow rates and vacancy 
equations in all countries for which we could get data on both unemployment 
outflows and job-to-job shifts for a number of years, namely Spain (where we had 
access to quarterly data over the 1987-94 period), UK and Germany (where data 
were available only at yearly frequencies in the 1983-93 period). Job-to-job shifts 
were derived as the difference between the total number of hirings in the economy 
and employment inflows. It should be stressed that the two flow data come from 




























































































contracts employers are legally compelled to notify) while employment inflows can 
be estimated on the basis of LFS data (e.g. retrospective questions or linked records 
as those discussed in Section 1). The role played by administrative data in the 
derivation of JJ shifts makes the latter figures not strictly comparable across 
countries.
Bearing the above caveats in mind, three facts, highlighted by Table 5 are particularly 
important. First, unemployment outflow equations not including employed 
jobseekers (first column) tend to display much higher coefficients for the stock of 
unemployed than specifications with JTOT or JPUSH (second and third column). 
This is consistent with the competition hypothesis: our model predicts that the 
omission of employed jobseekers from unemployment outflow equations could bias 
upwards unemployment stock coefficients. The inclusion of employed jobseekers in 
the unemployment outflow equation does not, however, affect the coefficient for 
vacancies, while we would have expected it to increase as a result of a better 
specification of the outflow equation. Second, outflow rates (equations 4 through 7) 
seem to be negatively affected by the number of employed jobseekers, especially 
those pushed to search for jobs. Recovering from our logit estimates the underlying 
elasticities, we have that an increase by one unit in the pool of employed jobseekers 
reduces the probability of job finds for the unemployed by .4 per cent. This effect is 
stronger in Germany than in the UK, while there is no indication that in Spain 
competition from employed jobseekers is stronger than in the UK (columns 6 and 7).
Third, vacancy growth is significantly decreasing in the number of job-to-job shifts, 
which is at odds with “musical chair” effects whereby job-to-job shifts involve a 
larger turnover of vacancies and are neutral (or positively affect) vacancy stocks. 
Overall, regression results displayed in Table 5 are broadly supportive o f 





























































































Why are "rigid" labour markets characterised by relatively large rates of job 
reallocation? How can it be that low-unemployment countries have the highest 
inflows into unemployment? In this paper we argue that these two rather puzzling 
facts have a common explanation. Rigid labour markets look flexible because their 
regulations reduce flows from employment to unemployment but induce larger job- 
to-job shifts; this implies greater competition for jobs between employed and 
unemployed jobseekers, and puts a cap on the number of hires involving persons 
coming from the ranks of the unemployed. As only the short-term unemployed can 
successfully compete for jobs with employed jobseekers, larger inflows into 
unemployment -- discouraging those with a job to engage in job search — may 
ultimately lower unemployment stocks.
The strategy followed in this paper to assess the empirical relevance of the model 
relies on aggregate data on labour market flows. While a better characterisation of 
job-to-job shifts can only come only from micro data on individual employment 
histories, estimates of aggregate matching functions have the advantage of subsuming 
substitution effects within the two populations of jobseekers and hence may offer a 
better basis to assess the extent and nature of competition between employed and 
unemployed jobseekers.
The estimates of matching functions presented in this paper are consistent with the 
presence of decreasing search effectiveness with unemployment duration. Thus, they 
do not invalidate a basic assumption of our model. We also find some support to the 
view, embedded in our model, that a larger number of employed jobseekers tends to 
reduce outflow rates from unemployment by taking up jobs which would be available 
otherwise to unemployed jobseekers. Unemployment outflows are particularly 
responsive to changes in the number of those searching on-the-job because their job 
is temporary or they face a high risk of being laid-off. Moreover, estimates of 
vacancy equations suggest that job-to-job shifts tend to reduce the number of 
employment opportunities available for unemployed jobseekers.
Two relevant policy issues are raised by the above observations. First, it may be 
counterproductive to try and contain the rise of unemployment during recessions by 




























































































unemployment has the negative implication of encouraging on-the-job search and this 
makes it even more difficult for those in the pool to find a new job. Put another way, 
strict employment security regulations can at best work only when unemployment is 
so low that its increased duration can be more than compensated by reduced inflows 
in the pool.
Second, given the strong competition exerted by employed “pushed” to search for 
jobs, the question arises as to whether public authorities in European countries should 
pursue greater flexibility in labour markets via the liberalisation of temporary 
contracts and other forms of precarious work. These measures -- if not accompanied 
by reduced costs to dismiss workers under indefinite duration jobs — may end up 
creating an intermediate status between employment and unemployment, which 
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The statiomuity o f  the wage distribution implies that employed not seeking a job will either lose their 
current position at the exogenous layoff rate d or continue to be employed without searching. We can 
therefore rewrite the value o f  being employed and not seeking for another job as follows:
_  \v + 8d Vu
' ~ l - s a - d )
(18)
Similarly, for given jts, the value o f  being short-term unemployed is time-invariant. Hence, we can 
solve (5) for Vu' and substitute this expression in (18). This yields:
w(l -8( l -Ki) )+8d(u-cu)( l+8)(m-K,)Ve = --------- ------------------------------------------------------ (19)
(1-8 ) +8d(l-8 - Ks + 2k sKi)+8(k i(1 - 8))
We now turn to the value of being employed jobseeker. Under our assumptions, (7) can be written as 
follows:
v . _ w -c 2 + 8[(l-tl)n,ma\(Ve, Vj) + dVu']
J ~ l -8(l -d)( l -n, )
Substituting (2) into (3), and noting that Vj is — for given Ttj — time-invariant, it is straightforward to 
show that employed jobseekers stop searching only at wages which are discretely (due to the presence 
o f search costs) above those currently earned. Notice further that both (2) and (3) are linearly 
increasing in the current wage, but Vj at a lower rate than Ve. This can be easily checked by 
considering the limiting case where transition probabilities are not state-dependent (that is, 7Cj =  Jli =  Jt,= 
n, which implies — by (2), (3) and (4) that also sj = si = su). In fact, in the latter case:
„ . , ,  8 n [ l-8  + K(8(l + d)-2d]
Vj -Ve» = ---------- :--------------------------------------------------------------------------  (21)
[ ( l - 8 f  + 8(d(l-8-n(l -2K)+n-8K)(8( l-K-d(l-n)- l )J
where Vj„ and Vew denote, respectively, the derivatives o f  (2) and (3) with respect to the current wage 
rate. The numerator o f (5) is positive, while the denominator is negative for any positive value o f  the 
discount factor. Finally, when the expected wage rate exceeds the cost o f  job search (otherwise 
nobody would ever search while being employed in our model), we have that Vj is positive for w=0, 
while Ve equals zero. Furthermore, both Vj and Ve are linear in current wages. Hence, the above 
implies existence and uniqueness o f  the locus Vj=Ve.
Given that employed differ only by the wage they receive, changes in ttj can be assimilated to shifts in 
the expected (after-search) wage rate, and will cause an upward shift o f  the Vj curve, while leaving the 





























































































employed jobseekers must increase (decrease). The degree by which J will react to changes in it, will 
depend on the shape o f  the wage distribution and on the position on it o f  the initial reservation wage, 





























































































A nnex  2
By implicit function rule, the slope o f  the UV curve is given by:
5V 
5 U
d + slM- U *MvV SJ * 
J *- 8 U'
4) V
-M,U * ( 1 - - L sj<l-U)) 
J *
(22)
where U* stands for the number o f  unemployed converted into efficiency units (i.e., su Us + si U ). A 
sufficient condition for the numerator being positive is that 8J*/8U' is negative1, whilst the denominator 
is negative since sj (j). V (1 -U) ~ sj J <  J* by definition. Inspection o f  higher order derivatives indicate 
that the curve is convex towards the origin.




-Y  -  M - .  - n » ,
(23)
where T|mv denotes the elasticity o f  job matching with respect to vacancies. Both numerator and 
denominators are negative when 8J*/8U' is negative. Second-order derivatives indicate that the curve 
is convex in U.
A marginal change in d, the exogenous layoff rate, would unambiguously shift outwards the UU curve. 
In fact, we have that along this curve:
bU_ 
8 d
1-U + M su(l-U)(
J* -1)
U *MvV 87 * 
J  *’ 8 U‘
-d-s lM
(24)
where r)mj. denotes the elasticity o f  job finds with respect to effective jobseekers. The numerator is 
negative insofar as r|mj and (U*/J*) are both less than unit. The denominator is negative as argued 
above.
1 The case where the UV curve is upward sloping, at least limited to some regions, and the 


































































































The numerator o f  (8) is positive (negative) when the number o f  effective jobseekers is decreasing 
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(evidence from linked IFS records and retrospective questions)
Flows from Employment Unemployment
to Out-of-the-labour force Inflows
a ) Linked LFS records (as % of employment) (as %  o f the LF)
Australia (92-93) 3.47 4.28
Canada (90-91) 9.71 6.34
Netherlands(90-92)(1) 2.06 1.61
Norway (92-93) 6.37 4.12
Spain (92-93) 4.45 2.26
Sweden(90-91) 2.88 3.59
US (92-93) 5.33 3.92
Flows from Employment Employment
to Out-of-the-labour force Outflows
b ) Retrospective questions (as % of employment) (as %  of employment)
Austria(90-91) 0.74 0.83
Luxembourg(91 -92) 2.85 3.71 .
UK (92-93) 3.84 5.48
US(89-90) 10.39 13.53
Europe-8 (1983-91) n.a. 6.70
Notes:
(1) Data for the Netherlands are averages of two-years transitions.
(2) Average period data.
Sources:

































































































































































































































Persons declaring to be searching for a job while being employed
(% of total employment, 1983-1991 average yearly data unless otherwise specified)
JTOT JPUSH JPULL JPUSH/JTOT
Belgium 2.596 1.955 0.641 75.30%
(0.180) (0.221) (0.164)
Czech Rep. 1993-94 4.885 1.537 3.348 31.46%
(0.087) (0.110) (0.085)
Denmark 5.811 2.426 3.384 41.75%
(0.187) (0.167) (0.332)
France 5.108 3.450 1.658 67.54%
(0.137) (0.183) (0.104)
Germany 2.056 1.290 0.766 62.75%
(0.135) (0.099) (0.219)
Great Britain 5.583 2.843 2.740 50.92%
(0.141) (0.114) (0.227)
Greece 3.072 1.731 1.341 56.35%
(0.174) (0.221) (0.157)
Ireland 4.729 2.561 2.167 54.16%
(0.050) (0.071) (0.098)
Italy 3.640 2.493 1.147 68.48%
(0.127) (0.168) (0.146)
Luxemburg 1992 1.808 0.941 0.867 52.03%
Netherlands 1987-1? 9.248 5.055 4.193 54.66%
(0.010) (0.222) (0.256)
Poland 1992-94 (2) 6.396 3.222 3.175 50.37%
(0.077) (0.101) (0.085)
Portugal 1986-1991 3.017 1.347 1.670 44.65%
(0.166) (0.216) (0.131)
Slovenia 1994 5.927 3.296 2.630 55.62%
Spain 1986-1991 2.049 1.543 0.506 75.31%
(0.323) (0J91) (0.147)
Correlation Coefficients
u V JTOT JPUSH
JTOT -0.04 0.43 •
JPUSH 0.15 0.24 0.91 *
JPU -0.21 0.54 * 0.92 * 0.68 •
Notes:
Coefficients of variation in parenthOne asterisk denotes significance at 5 per cent levels 
JTOT * Total of employed declaring, at the date of the survey, to be searching for another job;
JPUSH = employed declaring to be searching because either their current job is at risk or is temporary; 
JPULL = employed declaring to be searching for a better job.
(1) Quarterly data 93:2 - 94:3.
(2) Quarterly data 92:2 - 94:3.
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CHART 2: J o b  d e s t r u c t i o n  a n d  i n f l o w s  i n t o  u n e m p l o y m e n t
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